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Abstract
The Turkish government wanted to sell two GSM (cell-phone) licenses in 2000 with
sequential auctions. The winning bid in the first auction would be the reserve price for the
second auction. This auction design gives incentives to ``predatory bidding." We show how a
strategic firm will bid too high in the first auction; hence, no other firms can pay the reserve
price in the second auction. The winning firm will make up for the high-bid in terms of more
profit due to less competition in the market. We show that the government could have sold
the two licenses and raised more revenue in a correctly designed sequential auction.
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Auctions are increasingly used in allocating spectrum licenses since they provide e±cient
results. However, if the auctions are not designed carefully, seller might get unwanted results
like less revenue. In this paper, we will study one such auction; the Turkish Global Mobile
Telecommunications (GSM) auction held in 2000.
In this auction, the government wanted to sell two GSM licenses with a sequential auc-
tion.1 The winning bid in the ¯rst auction would be the reserve price for the second auction.
There were two incumbent ¯rms in the market; hence, the government's objective was to
increase competition in the cell-phone service market by having two more ¯rms and to get
as much revenue as possible. However, the government ended up selling only one license; no
¯rm participated in the second auction.
Klemperer (2002) writes that Turkish GSM auction is biased towards creating monopoly.
We model the auction formally and show that it will result in government selling only one
license. We also compare this auction with a \no-reserve price" auction, and hence, show
that the Turkish government's mistake was to set a reserve price in the second auction that
can be manipulated by the ¯rm that wins the ¯rst auction.
Ozcan (2004), in his working paper, also studies the same auction but compares it with
a second-price auction. In his paper, ¯rms' costs are private information and both licenses
can be sold under some cases in the original auction. Our paper is di®erent in a number of
respects. First, we model the ¯rms' costs as public information which gives a very simple
and transparent model. Second, we show that only one license will be sold in all possible
cases. Third, we compare the original auction with a no-reserve price auction and show that
the government would be able to sell both licenses and get more revenue with the latter one.
Therefore, we identify the reserve-price that can be manipulated by the ¯rms as the auction
design °aw.2
McMillan (1994) gives an overview of spectrum rights auctions and mentions the pos-
sibility of predatory bidding in sequential auctions. Pitchik and Schotter (1988), in an
experimental study, shows that predatory bidding occurs in sequential auctions if bidders
are budget constrained and bidders valuations are common knowledge. In our paper, bid-
ders valuations are common knowledge but predatory bidding occurs due to the design of
the auction.
2. The Model
The model mimics the real world case of the Turkish GSM auction as much as possible.
We consider a cell-phone market with two incumbent ¯rms. The government will sell (lease)
two more cell-phone licenses in a sequential auction administered in the same period. Each
auction format is a ¯rst-price sealed-bid auction. Firms can buy at most one license. The
1Ashenfelter (1989) and Jeitschko (1999) are a few examples that discuss sequential auctions.
2We became aware of this working paper well after starting our paper.
1winning bid of the ¯rst auction will be the reserve price for the second auction; that is, the
¯rm who wins the second auction will pay at least as much as the ¯rst auction winning bid.
We de¯ne the market inverse demand function as p = A ¡ bQ, where p and Q stand
for the market price and the market quantity demanded, respectively; A and b are positive
numbers. Incumbent and entrant ¯rms are identical. The ¯rms have zero costs. There are at
least 3 bidding (entrant) ¯rms. We assume that ¯rms in the cell-phone market will Cournot-
compete at each period t = 0;1;:: once they get the licenses. Each ¯rm's objective is to
maximize its discounted pro¯t (net of the bid they pay) with the discount factor ± 2 (0;1).
All ¯rms will decide how much to bid in the ¯rst and/or the second auction.
Assumption If there is a tie, the government will award the license with a lottery that
only the highest bidders participate.
In the proposition below, we characterize how the ¯rms will bid in the ¯rst auction and
prove that no ¯rm will win in the second auction.
Proposition 1 In the ¯rst auction, all ¯rms will bid A2
16b(1¡±). No ¯rm can win the second
auction.
Proof We denote the discounted pro¯t of a ¯rm with ¼j and per period quantity by qj
where the subscript j = 3;4 denotes how many ¯rms are competing in the market. After







(j + 1)2b(1 ¡ ±)
(1)
If the ¯rms bid high enough in the ¯rst auction, then no ¯rm will enter to the second
auction. Therefore, each ¯rm will bid in order to prevent the fourth ¯rm to enter to the
market until their pro¯ts are zero. That is, they will bid ¼3 = A2
16b(1¡±) in the ¯rst auction.
One ¯rm will be awarded the license via lottery according to our assumption. Then, in the
second auction, the remaining ¯rms can bid at most ¼4 = A2
25b(1¡±) but this is less than the
reserve price, and no ¯rm will win the second auction.
The ¯rms take advantage of the auction design °aw and only one license is sold. Firms
are willing to give up immediate money by bidding high since they know that they will
make up this in the form of higher pro¯ts due to the less competition in the market. Hence,
government's increased competition objective is not achieved.
Now, we assume that the government designs a sequential auction but does not specify a
reserve price for the second auction.3 We will call this auction a \no reserve price auction."
Proposition 2 In a no reserve price auction, ¯rms will bid A2
25b(1¡±) in both auctions. Both
licenses will be sold.
If a ¯rm bids ¼3 in the ¯rst auction, then it will make a loss since it can only make a
(gross) pro¯t of ¼4 in the market which is less than its bid. Once the reserve price condition is
3This is actually same as a simultaneous auction in which two licenses are sold.
2removed from the auction design, ¯rms can bid at most ¼4 since there is no way of preventing
entry of the fourth ¯rm; hence, both licenses are sold. Not only that the government can sell
two licenses, but it will also increase its revenue according to corollary 3 below. This shows
that setting the reserve price that can be manipulated with a bid in the ¯rst auction is the
°aw in the auction design.
Corollary 3 The government will have more revenue with a no reserve price auction com-
pared to the original auction.
Proof In the no reserve price auction, two licenses will be sold at a lower price compared
to the original auction. In the original auction, however, only one license will be sold. The
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Hence, revenues are always greater with the no reserve price auction.
If the government had not speci¯ed a reserve price, it would have been able to sell two
licenses (which means more competition and more social welfare) and would have raised
more revenue.
3. Conclusion and Discussion
We would like to discuss the possibility of one ¯rm being strategic and the others being
not strategic. Not strategic in the sense that they will bid ¼4 in the ¯rst auction. If the
strategic ¯rm believes that the other ¯rms are strategic, then only one license will be sold
and the results will be the same as the original auction! If the strategic ¯rm knows that the
other ¯rms are not strategic, then we will get the results of \no reserve price" auction.4
We show how and why a sequential auction results in predatory bidding, and hence, less
competition in the market. Turkish government sets a reserve price in the second auction that
depends on the ¯rst auction's winning bid. This gives the ¯rms the incentive of predatory
bidding. We show that in a sequential auction without a reservation price, two licenses would
be sold and more revenue would be raised.
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